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Living with an invisible neurological condition can involve physical, cognitive and 
psychosocial challenges.  The aim of this study was to explore the experience of 
living with an invisible neurological condition, particularly focusing on life within 
the context of the family.  Four people were interviewed: a man and a woman with 
traumatic brain injury (TBI) and a man and a woman with prosopagnosia (face-
blindness).  The participants’ ages ranged from 44 to 68 years, and all four were 
married with children whose ages ranged from preschool to adult.  The interviews 
were transcribed verbatim and analysed using a blend of thematic analysis and 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) methodology.  Four major themes 
were developed:  1) Feeling different; 2) Learning to cope; 3) Loneliness; and 4) 
Moral failure.  1) The participants felt that their experiences were “bizarre”, and 
they contrasted themselves with “normal” people and/or with their pre-injury 
selves.  2) The participants had learned and were learning strategies to cope with 
their condition including avoidance, acceptance of limitations, and active problem-
solving.  3) The participants were lonely at times.  They found social interaction 
difficult, but they wanted to be understood.  4) They felt that they did things that 
were somewhat shameful in order to live with their condition.  They felt guilty 
when they were unable to meet their own and others’ expectations, and believed 
that others judged them unfairly.  This study extends the TBI literature by showing 
that there are similarities between the lived experiences of TBI and of another 
neurological condition.  It enhances the literature regarding the lived experience of 
prosopagnosia, where little qualitative research has been done until recently.  The 
findings demonstrate some of the psychosocial consequences of prosopagnosia 
and TBI.  Health practitioners may benefit from having more awareness of these 
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“People don’t see it so they just assume and they think you’re nuts.”  
  ~Karl, a participant in this study, talking about his invisible brain injury. 
  
It is easy to assume that because someone looks perfectly normal, they have 
no more struggles in their life than anyone else.  But there are any number of 
hidden challenges which people face, and some of the most intriguing of these 
arise from neurological conditions.  The body of knowledge pertaining to 
neurological conditions is growing rapidly (Levack, Kayes, & Fadyl, 2010) and it is 
important that as well as understanding the mechanics of these conditions, health 
practitioners also gain insight into the subjective experience of those who live with 
them.  If they do not, they risk overlooking unmet needs among these populations, 
and perpetuating difficult situations which could be mitigated.  The 
phenomenological approach offers tools for examining the experiences of a few 
people in depth in order to reveal what their lives are ‘really like’.  At present, 
much of what is known about neurological conditions is taken from research 
performed in the highly contained, artificial and isolating environment of the 
laboratory.  Daily life, on the other hand, is lived within a social context, and 
usually involves various family relationships.  What impact does an invisible 
neurological condition have on family life?  
Neurological conditions are disorders of the central and peripheral nervous 
systems and vary widely in aetiology and expression (World Health Organization, 
2015).  They can be congenital (Kennerknecht, Grueter, Welling, Wentzek, & Horst, 
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2006), perhaps associated with a broader developmental disorder (Riby, Doherty-
Sneddon, & Bruce, 2008), or they can result from events during the prenatal, 
perinatal or early infancy periods (Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & 
Nakayama, 2008).  They can be caused by traumatic brain events, either disease-
associated such as tumours or strokes (Barton, 2008), or traumatic brain injury 
(TBI) (Skelton, Ross, Nerad, & Livingstone, 2006).   
The effects of a neurological condition can be obvious to an observer, for 
example unusual gait or facial spasm (Stone, n.d.); or they can be ‘invisible’, for 
example fatigue, altered sensory perception or cognitive deficits (Chaudhuri & 
Behan, 2004; Du, Ciuffreda, & Kapoor, 2005; Schmahmann & Sherman, 1998).  
Invisible symptoms are relatively common but members of the general public may 
be unaware of this fact (Linden & Boylan, 2010).  Fatigue is a common symptom of 
many neurological disorders, characterised by limited endurance of sustained 
mental and physical tasks and increased perceived effort (Chaudhuri & Behan, 
2004).  Perception of one or more senses may be diminished, as in the case of 
losing the sense of smell (Drummond, Douglas, & Olver, 2013), or heightened so 
that stimuli which would normally be moderate are experienced as uncomfortably 
intense (Du et al., 2005).  A wide variety of cognitive deficits are associated with 
neurological conditions, including difficulties with concentration and memory 
(Schmahmann & Sherman, 1998), topographic orientation (Barton, 2011), and face 
recognition (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990).  I selected TBI and prosopagnosia 
as the disorders to focus on for this study because they are relatively common 
forms of acquired and congenital primary neurological conditions, respectively 




A search of online databases Web of Science™ Core Collection and Google 
Scholar for ‘prosopagnosia’ with additional search terms such as ‘qualitative’, 
‘phenomenology’, and ‘experience’ returned very few qualitative studies of 
prosopagnosia.  I review three such studies in section 1.1.7 below.  I also searched 
directly for articles cited in quantitative and review studies of prosopagnosia, and 
found two first-hand narratives (including Zenonos, 2014).  In contrast, a similar 
search for ‘TBI’ or ‘brain injury’ with ‘qualitative’ or ‘experience’ revealed an 
abundance of published qualitative research on TBI.  This research includes 
studies of various elements in the timeline of the disorder, such as transition from 
hospital to home (Nalder, Fleming, Cornwell, Shields, & Foster, 2013), or returning 
to work or school (Hooson, Coetzer, Stew, & Moore, 2013; Plotts & Jantz, 2012); 
and studies specific to particular populations, including children with minor TBI 
(Sheehan et al., 2013), combat veterans with mild TBI (Daggett, Bakas, Buelow, 
Habermann, & Murray, 2013), and caregivers of family members with TBI (Nalder, 
Fleming, Cornwell, & Foster, 2012).   
Living with a neurological condition may impose challenges beyond the 
physical or cognitive ones determined by the nature of the disorder.  The family 
system may be affected, and the psychological health of the person with the 
condition may be at risk from anxiety and depression (Snell, Surgenor, Hay-Smith, 
& Siegert, 2009).  Living with an invisible condition may pose additional 
challenges: from one’s behaviours being misinterpreted, from failing to meet 
others’ expectations, and from an internal sense of guilt at not ‘feeling better’ when 
nothing is obviously wrong (Levack et al., 2010; Yardley et al., 2008).  For those 
with congenital neurological conditions, such as prosopagnosia, receiving a 
diagnosis of a condition which they have always had may or may not bring about a 
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change in self-identity, and it may in fact provide a sense of relief as it reduces 
their feeling of personal failure (Yardley et al., 2008).  For people who have 
experienced a TBI, a key challenge highlighted in psychosocial research is that of 
coping with change and loss of a previously formed identity (Levack et al., 2010).  
In both cases, family relationships and routines of the person can be affected by 
their condition, and the person’s experience of that condition can in turn be 
affected by their family context. 
In the following two sections I provide an overview of prosopagnosia and TBI 
to set the scene for the qualitative analysis that follows.  For each condition I 
outline their expression, aetiology, epidemiology, assessment, diagnosis, treatment 
interventions, and psychosocial impact, with a particular emphasis on previous 
qualitative studies.  In the third section, I introduce the research questions.   
1.1 Prosopagnosia  
Prosopagnosia (‘face-blindness’) is a neurological condition characterised by 
severe impairment in face recognition.  It is observed both as a symptom of more 
widespread cognitive problems, as in Alzheimer’s disease (Roudier et al., 1998) or 
autism (Riby et al., 2008), and as a syndrome in its own right (Barton, 2008).  
Broader conditions such as autism bring with them a plethora of other symptoms, 
which could mask the experiences specific to prosopagnosia and make 
phenomenological interpretation overly complex for a small qualitative study.  
Therefore, in the present study, I focused on the experience of prosopagnosia as a 
primary condition, not as a symptom of another disorder.  In the following section I 
outline prosopagnosia and its impact in three sections.  Firstly, I describe the 
subtypes of prosopagnosia in terms of expression (with or without perceptual 
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deficits) and of aetiology (caused by damage to the brain, whether by injury, 
surgery or other form of lesion; or congenital).  Secondly, I summarise the 
developmental course of congenital prosopagnosia including epidemiology, 
assessment, diagnosis and interventions.  Thirdly, I review the psychosocial impact 
of prosopagnosia and some of the reported associated mental health issues. 
1.1.1 Expression of prosopagnosia 
In 1890, Lissauer (cited in Behrmann & Avidan, 2005) suggested that there 
are two distinct categories of prosopagnosia: associative and apperceptive.  The 
associative subtype of prosopagnosia is observed when a patient is able to judge 
age, gaze, gender, expression and so on from images of faces but is not able to 
connect a face with an identity, implying that access to facial memories is the 
disrupted component of the facial recognition process.  In the apperceptive 
subtype, judgment of these facial properties is impaired, suggesting that the cause 
of the deficit lies upstream in the facial encoding component of the process 
(Barton, 2008).  Tranel and Denburg (2009) propose a third subtype: 
developmental prosopagnosia, as opposed to the two abovementioned subtypes 
which they define as being acquired through brain injury caused by trauma, 
infarctions or tumours. 
1.1.2 Aetiology of prosopagnosia 
The aetiology of prosopagnosia can be broadly considered as either an 
acquired or a developmental condition.  Acquired prosopagnosia is often seen with 
damage to the right medial occipitotemporal cortex, usually near the lingual and 
fusiform gyri, or to both inferior occipital and temporal visual association cortices 
(Barton, 2008; Tranel & Denburg, 2009).  The first definition of prosopagnosia in 
6 
 
scientific literature was given in 1867 (Barton, 2008) as “an acquired impairment 
arising as a consequence of brain injury” (Yardley et al., 2008, p. 445).  Transient 
prosopagnosia has also been reported following brain surgery (Mesad, Laff, & 
Devinsky, 2003; Otani et al., 2004). 
Developmental prosopagnosia may be genetic.  Kennerknecht et al. (2006) 
described a strong genetic component within people who had the condition, while 
Wilmer et al. (2010) found that 164 pairs of identical twins recruited from the 
general population in Australia showed more than twice the degree of correlation 
between their face recognition scores (.7) compared to 125 pairs of non-identical 
twins (.3).  Research has begun into exactly which genes encode for face 
recognition (Brown et al., 2012).  Prosopagnosia may also arise as a result of brain 
damage before birth or during early infancy, or from severely impaired vision 
during the period where the infant would normally be developing facial 
recognition pathways (Yardley et al., 2008).  In practice, it may be impossible to 
tell whether childhood-onset prosopagnosia has a genetic component or not, if 
both family history and infancy events are consistent with its development, or if 
neither is.   
1.1.3 Epidemiology of prosopagnosia 
Although acquired primary prosopagnosia is rare, it is common for people 
with acquired brain injury to have at least some difficulty with face recognition 
(Valentine, Powell, Davidoff, Letson, & Greenwood, 2006).  Developmental 
prosopagnosia was originally considered very unusual but is now thought to occur 
in about 2-2.5% of the population (Duchaine, 2008; Kennerknecht et al., 2006; 
Kennerknecht, Ho, & Wong, 2008).    
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The condition often goes unrecognised because people with prosopagnosia 
may not be aware that their inability to recognise faces at a glance is unusual 
(Yardley et al., 2008).  Therefore, the number of people with the condition is most 
likely considerably higher than the number diagnosed. 
1.1.4 Assessment and diagnosis of prosopagnosia 
Prosopagnosia is usually assessed with a series of face recognition tests and 
an interview or survey to rule out other possible causes of deficits, such as poor 
eyesight, autism, attention deficit disorders or social anxiety (Dalrymple, Corrow, 
Yonas, & Duchaine, 2012; Diaz, 2008; Yardley et al., 2008).  Testing often includes 
such tools as the Cambridge Face Memory Test (Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006) and 
tests for recognition of famous faces or family (Grueter et al., 2007).  
Prosopagnosia is commonly self-diagnosed, often after exposure to media on the 
subject1.  The relief that is reported at the diagnosis of prosopagnosia may 
especially be the case for parents of children with developmental prosopagnosia, 
as the diagnosis makes sense of a puzzling range of symptoms which may have 
been causing problems for the family, such as ignoring family members or being 
overly comfortable with strangers (Dalrymple et al., 2012; Yardley et al., 2008).  In 
a case described by Dalrymple et al. (2012), one child was tested for pervasive 
developmental disorder and Asperger’s syndrome (now classed under autism 
spectrum disorders; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), but did not 
demonstrate the social and behavioural deficits required for this diagnosis.   
                                            
1 For example, Oliver Sacks’ book The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (1985) , or the 60 
Minutes documentary on face blindness (Finkelstein, 2012). 
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“Specialists were baffled for years, and it was only when her parents came 
across the term “face blindness” that they had the “Aha!” moment they had 
been waiting for” (Dalrymple et al., 2012, p. 394).   
1.1.5 Development of prosopagnosia 
The developmental course of early prosopagnosia is not well studied 
(Dalrymple et al., 2012).  In general, face recognition difficulties will persist 
throughout childhood into adulthood and may be accompanied by other visual 
processing difficulties which may be discerned at a young age (Dalrymple et al., 
2012) or may become apparent as task requirements change with age, such as 
landmark agnosia (the inability to recognise familiar places) (Barton, 2011). 
1.1.6 Intervention in prosopagnosia 
Several attempts have been made to train people with prosopagnosia to 
recognize faces, both in childhood and adulthood (Dalrymple et al., 2012; DeGutis, 
Bentin, Robertson, & D'Esposito, 2007).  Results have been mixed.  In one reported 
intervention study, an 8-year-old child learned alternative methods for identifying 
familiar faces and at a 3-month follow-up maintained his improvements, although 
he was not able to generalize his new skills to faces which had not been part of the 
training set (Dalrymple et al., 2012).  In another study, a 48-year-old woman 
received intensive training in face recognition tasks and improved her speed and 
accuracy on those tasks to the point where she matched performance by people 
without prosopagnosia; however, her improvements faded after a month, although 
retraining was quicker than initial training (DeGutis et al., 2007).  This kind of 
training is time-consuming and repetitious (Dalrymple et al., 2012), and because of 
its limited generalisability it seems unlikely to provide much improvement to the 
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ongoing lived wellbeing of the person with the condition.  Alternatively, cognitive 
behavioural therapy or training in social skills may allow individuals to find 
adaptive strategies (Yardley et al., 2008); while ecological interventions such as 
psychoeducation for relevant others, for example school staff (Diaz, 2008), can 
make life easier both for the individual and for their social community.2  
Additionally, people with prosopagnosia may develop their own compensatory 
social strategies, such as treating everybody with warmth, or conversing in 
generalities until the other person gives some verbal clue to their identity (Yardley 
et al., 2008). 
1.1.7 Psychosocial impact of prosopagnosia 
Prosopagnosia can have both immediate and long-term psychosocial 
consequences.  Immediate consequences may differ between children and adults.  
For example, children with prosopagnosia who are not able to distinguish between 
family members and strangers may, for example, allow themselves to be picked up 
from school by a strange adult (Dalrymple et al., 2012; Diaz, 2008), or they may be 
punished for failing to respond politely to known adults (Yardley et al., 2008).  One 
twelve-year-old girl had her social opportunities limited by her parents after she 
was seen speaking with a strange man as if he were familiar (Dalrymple et al., 
2014).   Adults with prosopagnosia also may respond inappropriately to others, 
either with excessive familiarity or by ignoring someone well-known (Yardley et 
al., 2008); however, such social gaffes are more likely to lead to embarrassment 
and anxiety rather than physical danger or chastisement. 
                                            
2 Technological solutions for people with prosopagnosia are currently being investigated (Xi, Xi, 
Prakash, Weidong, & Gnawali, 2013), and innovations like Google Glass™ may have significant 
impact in the future.  However, these exciting developments are outside the scope of the present 
study as they did not enter the participants’ lived experiences of prosopagnosia. 
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Both social anxiety and depression have been reported in people with 
prosopagnosia.  Social anxiety disorder can seriously affect day-to-day functioning, 
as people fear and avoid potentially embarrassing social situations, and the 
disorder has been associated with poorer physical health when anxiety becomes 
somatised with symptoms such as palpitations and shortness of breath (Kroenke, 
Spitzer, Williams, Monahan, & Löwe, 2007; Simon, Gater, Kisely, & Piccinelli, 1996; 
Yardley et al., 2008).  Depression can occur with social isolation and a sense of 
failure and guilt, especially if no clinical diagnosis of prosopagnosia has been made 
to offer an explanation for that failure (Yardley et al., 2008).  For example, one 
young person with prosopagnosia suffered depression and suicidal ideation after 
feeling that he was continually failing to meet the social and behavioural 
requirements of high school (Diaz, 2008).  Furthermore, people with 
prosopagnosia may find employment opportunities curtailed if they are unable to 
meet the demands of working directly with numerous other people, as in retail 
(Diaz, 2008).  This is especially true for people with acquired prosopagnosia, who 
may have held such a job previously but have found their capacity changed 
following the prosopagnosia acquisition event (Riddoch, Johnston, Bracewell, 
Boutsen, & Humphreys, 2008).  This concept of coping with capacity change will be 
covered in more detail in section 1.2.5 on TBI below.   
Prosopagnosia can impact the family, but little is known about this from 
previous research.  Much of the qualitative research available is in the form of case 
studies (for example Diaz, 2008) which focus on providing interventions for the 
individual, rather than an open-ended exploration of lived experience.  Dalrymple 
et al.’s (2012) review of studies of developmental prosopagnosia includes a 
summary of existing case studies, but aims chiefly to extend understanding of 
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normal and abnormal face perception, and psychosocial effects are noted only 
briefly.   
In repeated searches I have found only two qualitative studies of 
prosopagnosia.  Most recently, Dalrymple et al. (2014) interviewed eight children 
(aged between 5 and 14 years, 3 of them girls) with developmental prosopagnosia 
and their parents.   In order to establish a valid diagnosis of prosopagnosia, the 
research team had to develop a new set of tests for face perception and memory 
which were suitable for children (Croydon, Pimperton, Ewing, Duchaine, & 
Pellicano, 2014).  The findings of this study were divided into three child themes 
and three parent themes:  children were aware of their deficits, had coping 
strategies to manage them, and said their struggles were “not funny”; while their 
parents wished they knew what their children were experiencing, helped them to 
cope, and found it difficult that their children were struggling (Dalrymple et al., 
2014, p.147).  This study nicely draws out both individual and shared experiences 
from the participants, and integrates them into a coherent framework.  Its purview 
is restricted to children, however. 
The earlier, extensive study by Yardley et al. (2008) took a more wide-
ranging approach.  The second and third authors performed telephone interviews 
with 25 adults who scored below 44 out of 72 correct on the Cambridge Face 
Memory Test, asking a range of open-ended questions about living with 
developmental prosopagnosia.  Their findings following thematic analysis covered 
a range of topics, organised into short-term and long-term psychosocial effects.  
This broad approach, however, meant that no topic was explored in great depth, 
including the person with prosopagnosia’s experience of family life (Yardley et al., 
2008).  The present qualitative study aimed to delve deeply into the lived 
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experience of family life from the perspective of a person with prosopagnosia or 
TBI.   
1.2 Traumatic Brain Injury  
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) has been the subject of much qualitative and 
quantitative research in recent years.  The guideline for best practice from the New 
Zealand government’s no-fault injury insurance provider, the Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC), defines TBI as: “an acute brain injury resulting 
from mechanical energy to the head from external physical forces” which results in 
at least one of the following: “confusion or disorientation; loss of consciousness; 
post-traumatic amnesia; other neurological abnormalities” (New Zealand 
Guidelines Group, 2006, p. 22).  Usually, and in the present study, the term ‘person 
with TBI’ is used to mean someone who is experiencing the consequences of 
having sustained such an injury, even if any acute markers of injury such as 
contusions or lacerations have resolved.  In this section I will first briefly describe 
some commonly experienced symptoms of TBI.  Secondly, I will outline 
epidemiology, assessment, diagnosis and treatment.  Thirdly, I will explore 
psychosocial aspects of living with TBI, with particular reference to its impact on 
families. 
1.2.1 Symptoms of traumatic brain injury 
A person sustaining a TBI may subsequently experience a wide variety of 
behavioural, functional, physiological and psychological problems.  These 
problems are sometimes obvious to outside observers; sometimes they are not 
(Robertson, 2008).  Obvious deficits may include: altered gait, blindness, paralysis, 
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or visible scarring.  Less obvious deficits may include anxiety, fatigue, head and 
neck pain, irritability, low mood, and loss of concentration and memory (Snell & 
Surgenor, 2006).  More rarely, there may be loss of sensory perception (e.g.  
olfaction: Drummond et al., 2013), loss of specific cognitive skills (e.g.  face 
recognition or loss of spatial navigation skills: Barton, 2008; Skelton et al., 2006), 
and personality change (Conneeley, 2002).  These deficits may be transient or they 
may be permanent (Lorenz, 2010).   
1.2.2 Epidemiology of traumatic brain injury 
A recent New Zealand study found an incidence of 790 TBIs per 100 000 
people per year, substantially higher than the rate in Europe (up to 453) or North 
America (up to 618) (Feigin et al., 2013).  According to this population-based 
incidence study of the Waikato region and Hamilton city3 carried out from 1 March 
2010 to 28 February 2011, the incidence of TBI was higher among males than 
females, higher among Māori than other ethnic groups, and 95% of TBIs were 
classified as mild.  The most common causes of TBI were falls (especially in the 
under 5- and over 65-year age categories), exposure to mechanical force, transport 
accidents, and assault (Feigin et al., 2013). 
Prevalence of TBI is difficult to assess, because definitions of TBI differ, 
severity varies widely between patients, and the brain injury event often goes 
unreported (Frost, Farrer, Primosch, & Hedges, 2013).  One meta-analysis of fifteen 
studies which reported on TBI prevalence in the general adult population in the 
USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand suggested a figure of 12.1% of adults with 
                                            
3 This region was selected because it was found to be demographically representative of New 
Zealand as a whole (Feigin et al., 2013). 
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a lifetime history of TBI, or 16.68% of men and 8.55% of women (Frost et al., 
2013). 
1.2.3 Assessment and diagnosis of traumatic brain injury 
Diagnosis of TBI usually follows assessment in a hospital emergency 
department or by a general practitioner, accounting for the patient’s history and 
presentation with symptoms such as “confusion, disorientation, loss of 
consciousness, post-traumatic amnesia or other neurological abnormalities (such 
as focal neurological signs, seizures or intracranial lesions)” (Levack et al., 2010, p. 
988; New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2006).  The severity of the injury is usually 
classified according to the Glasgow Coma Scale, where the patient’s response to 
stimuli is assessed against three standardised criteria: eye opening, verbal 
response and motor response (Gonzalez & Moore, 2012; Teasdale & Jennett, 1974).  
A higher score indicates a higher level of consciousness.  The scores categories are 
defined as follows: a score between 3 (the lowest possible score) and 8 is classed 
as severe TBI; a score between 9 and 12 represents a moderate TBI; and a score of 
13 or over represents a mild TBI (New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2006). 
1.2.4 Treatment of traumatic brain injury 
Traumatic brain injury is a complex disorder with cognitive, sensory, 
physical and psychological sequelae which develop over varying timescales.  
Treatment of a TBI typically involves phases of acute injury management (often 
within a general hospital), rehabilitation (often in a specialist rehabilitation centre) 
and community reintegration (Snell et al., 2009).  Rehabilitation approaches may 
include both restorative (seeking to help the patient restore lost function) and 
compensatory therapies (to help the patient adapt their behaviours to work 
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around deficits) and may incorporate drug regimens, physiotherapy, cognitive 
retraining, behavioural interventions and a variety of alternative treatments such 
as art or music therapy (National Institutes of Health, 1998).  The support offered 
during the community reintegration phase may range from structured follow-up 
and community care, through provision of educational material, to no further 
formal input (Snell et al., 2009).   
Patient-centred philosophies of rehabilitation which include subjective 
measures of wellness (such as feelings of enjoyment, or of achieving something 
worthwhile) (Levack, McPherson, & McNaughton, 2004) are beginning to have an 
impact on governmental guidelines for rehabilitation (for example New Zealand 
Guidelines Group, 2006).  Additionally, as endorsed by Levack, Siegert, Dean, and 
McPherson (2009), treatment guidelines for TBI now consider the effect of the TBI 
on the patient’s family as a whole (New Zealand Guidelines Group, 2006).  This is 
especially vital in a New Zealand context, given the centrality of whānau in Māori 
culture (Levack et al., 2009).   
1.2.5 Psychosocial impact of traumatic brain injury 
Qualitative studies with TBI participants reveal that feelings of having lost 
one’s identity after brain injury are common, along with a disconnect from one’s 
social world, and the need to rebuild one’s identity in a way that includes both old 
and new characteristics.  To provide a broad overview, Levack et al. (2010) 
performed a systematic metasynthesis of 23 qualitative studies of TBI participants’ 
experience of rehabilitation and outcomes including research from New Zealand, 
Australia, the United Kingdom and North America.  A metasynthesis is similar to 
thematic analysis of primary data, but the data analysed are prior research 
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findings.  The full research articles were entered into computer software designed 
to manage qualitative data;  the research team then categorised the reported 
findings, discussing emerging themes until the team reached consensus on a final 
structure for the synthesis of the data (Levack et al., 2010).  The three common 
themes Levack et al. identified across participant experiences of TBI were: 1) 
disconnect with their pre-injury self, mind/body disconnect, and social disconnect, 
within an overwhelming sense of loss and suffering; 2) reconstruction of their self-
identity, their place in the world and their personhood; and 3) the internal and 
external resources used to facilitate those reconstructions.  These themes may 
seem to represent linear stages of progression but Levack et al. (2010) emphasised 
the iterative nature of TBI experience, such that some participants reported feeling 
strong emotions of “loss and personal suffering” (p. 990) many years after clinical 
symptoms had settled or disappeared.  Loss of the pre-injury self was embodied in 
changes to personality, loss of memory, and a subjective “ineffable” sense of “just 
[feeling] different” (Levack et al., 2010, p. 994).  Mind/body disconnect was 
experienced as a loss of control over a body that was slower, less agile or lacked 
stamina, or with a sense of unfamiliarity which did not necessarily diminish over 
time.  Social disconnect was sometimes deliberately initiated by people with TBI as 
a coping strategy, and sometimes occurred when family members or friends of the 
person with TBI used avoidant strategies to cope with TBI-associated changes.  
When there was no outward sign of injury, onlookers sometimes mistook 
coordination and balance deficits for inebriation, and other subtle issues for 
mental illness, so some participants would avoid social contact out of a rational 
fear of negative reactions from others (Howes, Benton, & Edwards, 2005).  
Additionally, people with TBI sometimes lost jobs (and often thereby their contact 
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with workmates) or intimate relationships.  These losses were accompanied by 
strong negative emotions including grief, loneliness, guilt, self-blame, vulnerability 
and powerlessness (Levack et al., 2010). 
The effect of TBI in changing social relationships and the mixed feelings of 
people with TBI towards these changes are clearly illustrated in a study by 
Conneeley (2002).  Eighteen patients with severe TBI and their “significant other” 
were interviewed individually at three points in time: on discharge from a 
neurological rehabilitation hospital, six months later and then another six months 
after that.  Participants, both the persons with TBI and their significant others, felt 
that others saw the person with a TBI predominantly as a “head-injured patient”, 
rather than as a friend or colleague (Conneeley, 2002, p. 360).  Some participant 
dyads felt that they deliberately chose a lifestyle with fewer social engagements as 
a way for the person with TBI to rest and recover, or because that is what they had 
always preferred.  Others felt that changes in their social relationships were a 
natural part of life—for example, when social activities were restricted by having 
small children.  Relationships within the family were often reported as having 
changed as a result of the injury, but not necessarily for the worse.  Some 
participants felt that their relationships were improved because of each partner’s 
increased appreciation of the strengths of the other, or because the person with 
the TBI had more time at home to spend with family (Conneeley, 2002). 
For a person with a TBI, reconstruction of his or her self-identity can involve 
both acceptance of the newly vulnerable or impaired body, and purposeful 
focusing on strengths (Lorenz, 2010).  Reconstructing a place in the world requires 
support from friends, family and health professionals to find opportunities for 
rehabilitative activities and for reintegration into public situations, including work, 
18 
 
which may need to be adapted to suit the needs of the person with TBI (Levack et 
al., 2010).  Family members may be seen as “an integral part of the … rehabilitation 
process” (Levack et al., 2009, p. 195).  Reconstruction of personhood can be 
described as spiritual “in the broad sense of finding meaning and purpose in life” 
and as such can be part of rehabilitative goal setting (Siegert, Ward, Levack, & 
McPherson, 2007, p. 1608).  Some people continue to struggle to redefine 
themselves after TBI (Howes et al., 2005; Jones & Curtin, 2011a), while others find 
a positive angle.  The participant-author in one autoethnographic study wrote:  
“‘My deficits remain; but I have learned to live relatively peaceful [sic] with 
them, integrating them into my being and managing to enjoy a life which is 
still rich and active.  It is not my previous life.  Most people live once; I have 
had the opportunity to live twice.’” (Lawson, Delamere, & Hutchinson, 2008, 
p. 249). 
1.3 Summary of the Reviewed Literature 
Prosopagnosia and TBI are relatively common examples of congenital and 
acquired neurological conditions, respectively, and they have well-described 
symptoms, which make them ideal candidates as conditions for study.  There are 
some similarities between them, and some obvious differences.  Both are invisible 
to an observer, and both have sequelae which affect social behaviour and 
relationships.  Themes of social isolation were seen in the literature surrounding 
both conditions (Levack et al., 2010; Yardley et al., 2008) and in both I found 
mention of coping strategies.  For both conditions, these strategies include 
working to improve the participant’s skills and finding ways to work around 
permanent deficits.   
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The key difference between the two conditions is the nature of the 
condition’s onset.  Much of the qualitative literature on TBI deals with managing 
the change from pre-injury to post-injury self, whereas this is not seen in 
congenital or developmental prosopagnosia. The diagnosis of prosopagnosia 
(whether formal or informal) of this lifelong condition may have a significant 
psychological impact, but this is not well known or described.  This introduces a 
second contrast between the literature on TBI and prosopagnosia:  the amount of 
qualitative research available.  What is available regarding prosopagnosia largely 
deals with public contexts (i.e. school and employment).  The lived experience of 
prosopagnosia within the context of family life has not yet been covered in any 
depth.  By contrast, there is a wealth of qualitative research of varying 
methodologies into TBI, but again I found little which covered the experience of 
family life from the perspective of a person with TBI. 
1.4  Research Questions   
The aim of the present qualitative study was to explore in depth the 
experience of living with an invisible neurological condition such as prosopagnosia 
or TBI, particularly in the context of family life.  This aim may be framed by the 
following four questions:  1) How does having an invisible neurological condition 
affect the day-to-day functioning of this person in the world?  2) How has this 
person experienced the effect of their invisible neurological condition on their 
family life, in terms of their interactions with their partner and children?  3) How 
are these experiences affected by the aetiology of the condition – be it congenital 
(prosopagnosia) or acquired (TBI)?  And finally, 4) are there gender-based 
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differences in the way family life is experienced between men and women with an 




2 Methodology and Methods 
 
2.1  Methodology:  Interpretative Phenomenological 
Analysis 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was selected as the 
methodology for the present study because it is well-suited to answering research 
questions about lived experiences.  I approached my research with no hypotheses, 
but I was interested in the participants’ experiences of their condition and the 
meanings they attached to those experiences.  My research questions about the 
effect of condition aetiology and participant gender on experience (section 1.4 
above) were exploratory questions, not hypotheses of difference.  Two key 
elements of IPA which made it the ideal methodology for this study are flexibility 
and the “double hermeneutic” (Smith, 2004, p. 40).  Smith and Osborn (2008) 
stated that: “research questions in IPA are usually framed broadly and openly.  
There is no attempt to test a predetermined hypothesis of the researcher; rather, 
the aim is to explore, flexibly and in detail, an area of concern” (p. 55).  The term 
‘double hermeneutic’ means that participants engage in making sense of their 
experiences, and then the researcher engages in making sense of the participants’ 
sense-making (Smith, 2004).   
In the following sections, I firstly locate IPA in the spectrum of qualitative 
methodologies, and secondly I describe its core practices of 1) interpreting 




2.1.1 IPA among qualitative methodologies   
IPA is a qualitative methodology that involves examining the details of 
individual participants’ experiences, usually as recounted in semi-structured 
interviews, and relating those details to overarching themes drawn from 
interviews with a series of participants (Smith, 2004).  IPA studies have 
similarities with grounded theory studies, where the aim is to develop theories to 
explain social processes (Starks & Brown Trinidad, 2007), and also with narrative 
psychology research or discourse analysis, which tend to focus on a single 
participant’s story (Murray, 2008).   
In grounded theory methodology, researchers begin to construct theories 
early on, and the theories under construction shape the data collection process 
(Charmaz, 1990).  Data collection continues until theoretical saturation is reached 
and no new constructs are being formed.  This can lead to sample sizes of up to 60 
people (Starks & Brown Trinidad, 2007), or repeated interviews and “a stack of 
transcripts and field notes” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 81).  By contrast, IPA researchers 
make no attempt to uncover all possible expressions of a theme, but instead 
explore the embodied perceptions of a small, carefully selected group of 
participants in order to illuminate a common experience (Starks & Brown 
Trinidad, 2007).  Nor does IPA seek to develop theories; rather, published theories 
provide a potential framework for making sense of experience.  This theoretical 
framing is one of the final stages of IPA research, once themes have been extracted 
from interview transcripts and one or more themes are recognised as supporting 
an existing theory (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009).   
Discourse analysis, narrative research, and other similar forms of qualitative 
methodology focus primarily on the words participants use.  The philosophical 
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underpinning of these methodologies is that participants’ knowledge is 
constructed by the words they and others use, and therefore the exact form of 
words that participants use is minutely examined (Starks & Brown Trinidad, 
2007).  This is particularly striking in conversation analysis, where the very length 
of pauses is recorded (Drew, 2008).  By contrast, phenomenological philosophy 
holds that there is such a thing as a ‘real’ experience, which becomes a 
‘phenomenon’ when we reflect upon that experience and interpret it (Smith et al., 
2009); therefore, in IPA the focus is less on the words and more on the meaning of 
the experience under examination. 
2.1.2 Interpreting experience   
The term ‘phenomenology’ comes from the philosophies of Edmund Husserl, 
Martin Heidegger and George Herbert Mead, in which IPA has its roots (Hale, 
Treharne, & Kitas, 2007).  These philosophers focused on the way people perceive 
their lives in the world and make sense of their experiences.  According to 
phenomenologists, a meaningful experience contains many components and thus 
has many levels available for interpretation, termed a “hierarchy of experience” 
(Smith et al., 2009, p. 2).  Smith et al. (2009) gave a hypothetical example of a 
formerly enthusiastic swimmer returning to a public beach to swim for the first 
time since major surgery.  At its most basic, this person can describe their 
experience in terms of sensory input: “becoming aware of the pebbles or the heat 
of the sun” (Smith et al., 2009, p. 2).  At a higher level of interpretation, significant 
events will often be accompanied by emotion, in this case joyful anticipation 
mingled with concern about unsightly scars or whether one is still able to swim, 
which form another component of the experience.  A third level of interpretation 
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would describe its “larger significance in the person’s life”: its connection to 
important past events, thus being a marker of recovery or of “return of a lost self” 
(Smith et al., 2009, p. 2).  Finally, these themes would be placed within a 
theoretical framework of illness experience and recovery, which involves 
interpretation by the researcher.  The role of the researcher in making sense of the 
participants’ personal experiences is central and is made explicit through reflexive 
practice (Finlay, 2002). 
2.1.3 Reflexivity  
In IPA, it is acknowledged that all researchers have their own lived 
experience, understandings and background, which they cannot help but bring to 
their research; phenomenologists question the very notion of objectivity (Finlay, 
2002).  It is critical that the researcher is aware of her4 own biases and 
preconceptions, otherwise she could be guilty of shaping her interview questions, 
analyses, or even participant selection to address her own theories rather than 
hearing what participants have to say (Hale, Treharne, & Kitas, 2008).  Therefore, 
at every step of the process, the researcher must make herself known to readers in 
order that her role may be taken into account (Finlay, 2002).   
In undertaking the present study, as I planned the interviews I bore in mind 
that because I am Pākehā5 and a Christian, I come from a cultural and religious 
background that values independence and the ability to work, as well as 
heterosexual marriage and the nuclear family.  Therefore I expected that 
participants would want to return to work, and would want to maintain marital 
                                            
4 I have given the hypothetical researcher the feminine pronoun throughout, since I am talking 
about research I have done, and I am a woman. 




relationships.  Additionally, having spent two years with an invisible but mildly 
debilitating neurological condition, I expected the study participants to have 
experienced similar fatigue and isolation, and to have relied similarly on family 
support.   
Having recognised these expectations in myself, I put together a schedule of 
open-ended interview questions, which were discussed with my supervisors.  I 
have had training in reflective listening and communication skills for an 
extracurricular voluntary position, and I endeavoured to approach each interview 
with open-minded curiosity, listening to participants carefully and respectfully.  
Additionally, as is common in qualitative research (Guba, 1981), after performing 
my analysis I discussed the individual case summary and combined themes with 
each participant, to ensure firstly that our conversation had been captured 
accurately, and secondly that the themes I identified made sense to them (Hale et 
al., 2008).  This process is analogous to internal validity checking in a quantitative 
study in that it provides a means to guard against bias or selective attention on the 
part of the researcher. 
2.2  Procedure 
2.2.1 Ethics  
I obtained ethics approval from the University of Otago Human Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix 6.1).  This required attention to the ethical principles of:  
1) informed consent; 2) cultural sensitivity; 3) protection from harm; and 4) 
confidentiality.  These principles were addressed by the following processes:  1) 
Before arranging interview sessions, I provided each participant with separate 
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information and consent forms, ensuring that they were aware of the purpose and 
procedure of the study and that they had the right to withdraw at any time.  2) I 
consulted with local iwi (Ngāi Tahu) via the University of Otago’s formal 
consultation process (Appendices 6.2 and 6.3), and recorded each participant’s 
ethnic identity as they preferred.  3) I ensured that each participant was 
encouraged to have a support person present during the interview if they so 
desired, and I took to each interview a sheet with options for further support 
(Appendix 6.4) in case the participant seemed distressed (Hale et al., 2008).  This 
list was generated in consultation with Cathy Matthews, the liaison person for the 
local branch of the Brain Injury Society.  4) All names and identifying details of 
participants or their family members were removed from transcripts, and 
necessary contact details and other information were kept in password protected 
computer files or physically under lock and key.  Contact details were separated 
from other details and the links preserved using participant codes.  In the write-up, 
all names and identifying details were removed or changed.  Sometimes in 
qualitative research a participant wishes to have their real name published (Tilley 
& Woodthorpe, 2011).  Because this study focused on effects on the family, 
however, more people than the individual participant had the potential to be 
affected by publication of the research, and it would not be feasible to gain consent 
from all involved.  Therefore, participants’ anonymity was mandatory. 
2.2.2 Participants   
The participants were purposively selected members of the general public 
who were currently experiencing effects of a specific neurological condition.  To be 
included, participants had to have either 1) a self-reported history of traumatic 
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brain injury with problems which had persisted for at least twelve months 
following injury and which they were still experiencing, or 2) a self-reported 
diagnosis matching congenital (lifelong) prosopagnosia.  It is typical in 
phenomenological studies of this type to select a homogeneous sample in order to 
explore shared themes of experience.  One focus of the study was family life, and 
for the purpose of this study family was defined as having a partner and children.  
Accordingly to be included participants had to have a current partner and children.  
Because the other focus of the study was the effect of having an invisible condition, 
people who had visible physical impairments following a brain injury were 
excluded.  Finally, people with other severe or terminal health conditions, or with 
broader conditions whose symptoms could be similar to those under study (autism 
spectrum disorder, for example) were not invited to participate.   
Selection methods varied among participants.  Information on the study was 
sent to a number of relevant groups, selected from a comprehensive website listing 
disability support services, after phone and email contact requesting that they 
display a recruitment poster where potential participants or caregivers would see 
it (see Appendix 6.5).  This strategy generated a response from only one person, 
who did not meet inclusion criteria.  At a “Brain Day” expo run by the Neurological 
Society in 2013, I had visited the booths staffed by various groups and informed 
them of my proposed research.  I maintained contact with the liaison person of the 
local Brain Injury Society after that, and when I informed her that I was ready to 
start finding participants, she spoke to two people who met the inclusion criteria 
and gained permission to give their contact details to me.  I telephoned both of 
them and subsequently emailed the study information.  The local newspaper 
printed an article about the prosopagnosia angle of the study (see Appendix 6.6) 
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and called for recruits; eleven people responded, of whom two were selected.  My 
final participant group comprised one man and one woman with TBI and one man 
and one woman with prosopagnosia (see Table 1). 
Table 1:  Participants at Time of First Interview 
Pseudonym 
(Gender) 





Charlotte (F) NZ European 
/ Pākehā 
44 (14) TBI Homemaker 
(manager) 
Huia (F) NZ European 
/ Pākehā 
51 (2) Prosopagnosia Teacher 
Karl (M) NZ European 
/ Pākehā 
47 (4) TBI Homemaker 
(forester) 
Murray (M) NZ European 
/ Pākehā 
68 (2) Prosopagnosia Farmer 
2.2.3 Data Collection 
I created a list of interview questions and prompts and discussed them with 
my supervisors.  I aimed to make the questions as open-ended as possible, in order 
to minimise the impact of my own expectations (Hale et al., 2008).  The interview 
schedule (Appendix 6.7) was designed to follow a natural flow of conversation, 
starting with fact-based questions (for example, “Tell me about when you had your 
injury”) and moving towards those with a more intimate bent (for example, “What 
effect do you think it has, the fact that people can’t see anything ‘wrong’ with 
you?”), in order to allow time for trust and rapport to be built between myself and 
the participant. 
An information sheet (Appendix 6.8) was emailed to potential participants.  
Once the research team was satisfied that a participant met inclusion criteria, the 
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consent form (Appendix 6.9), demographic questionnaire (Appendix 6.10) and 
interview questions were emailed to him or her.  The interview questions were 
sent in advance so that participants would have the opportunity to reflect before 
the interview, and perhaps be able to provide more insight than if they were facing 
the questions ‘on the spot’.  This was in accordance with research on working with 
people with communication difficulties (Paterson & Scott-Findlay, 2002).  I gave 
each person the option of being interviewed at their own home or at the 
University, or by Skype6 if they lived out of the local area.  I interviewed two local 
participants in their homes and one at her workplace and I arranged a Skype 
interview with the fourth participant who lived more than 100 kilometres away.  
On arrival at a participant’s home or workplace (or at the start of the Skype 
interview), I confirmed that he or she had read the information and consent forms, 
and gained signed consent.  Following the usual cultural practice, I was offered a 
hot drink by the three participants I interviewed in person.  I felt that accepting 
hospitality could help reduce any implicit power imbalance between researcher 
and participant, and therefore I agreed to a ‘cuppa’.  In the case of the Skype 
interview, I verbally mentioned this common practice in order to set a comfortable 
atmosphere: “Normally at this stage of the interview, you know, I’d come in and 
have a cup of tea and meet your cat and things like that [laugh].”  Each participant 
then completed the demographic questionnaire if they had not done so already, 
and was interviewed using the semi-structured interview format which they had 
received.  In the case of the Skype interview, the participant had jotted notes on the 
interview schedule I had sent and sent it back to me, which indicated that perhaps 
my purpose in sending the questions was unclear.  In this case I explained that we 
                                            
6 Freely downloadable and widely used video-conferencing  software. 
30 
 
would go more fully into the answers and expand on what I had been given.  
Interviews ranged between 31 and 46 minutes in length and were recorded using a 
digital audio recorder.  In the case of the Skype interview, I placed the digital audio 
recorder on the laptop computer I was using for the interview so that it could 
clearly record the sound from the laptop’s speakers.  One participant chose to have 
his wife present during the interview, and she contributed as well, although I 
maintained my focus of questioning on the participant himself.  I took to each 
interview the sheet with options for further support (Appendix 6.4), as detailed in 
the section on ethics above, in case the participant seemed distressed by the 
conversation; however, it was not required by anyone.  A few days after each 
interview, the participants were mailed a thank-you card and a $20 voucher 
(funded by the University of Otago Psychology Department) to reimburse them for 
any expenses incurred.  I transcribed the interviews fully, including hesitations and 
underlining words that the participant had emphasised.  Each transcript was 
reviewed by the whole research team and checked for accuracy by a fellow 
postgraduate student in the Health Psychology laboratory.   
I arranged a second interview with each participant approximately one year 
later, in which I checked with them their individual case summary (Appendices 
6.11.1-4) and a summary of the overarching themes I had developed.  This second 
interview was not recorded and transcribed, but field notes were taken and the 
participants’ input taken into account in the final writing up of the findings.    
2.2.4 Analysis 
To analyse the data, I blended Smith et al.’s (2009) guidance on IPA with 
some of the processes described by Braun and Clarke (2006).  I read the 
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transcripts repeatedly, firstly copying them into a spreadsheet programme and 
noting any recurring themes within each individual’s interview.  For example, 
Charlotte used the words “achiever”, “successful” and “pushed myself” in her 
answer to my first question, which called attention to her predominant narrative 
of determination and hard work leading to success.  Having repeated this process 
for each of the four transcripts, I printed out a clean copy of each and went over 
them, systematically coding them line by line.  I then searched the highlighted and 
annotated transcripts for commonalities.  I began charting common themes as they 
emerged, organising them to ensure they flowed together well and did not overlap 
excessively.  Throughout this phase I continually returned to the data to ensure 
that the themes truly reflected the participants’ experiences.  During this process I 
had regular meetings with my two supervisors and discussed the emerging content 
of themes.  Finally I refined the names of the themes and selected key quotes to 
illustrate each.   The final flow and content of each theme was refined as I wrote 






Four overarching themes were formulated from the four participants’ 
narratives.  These themes encapsulate separate but interconnected aspects of 
living with an invisible neurological condition.  The themes were: 1) Feeling 
different;  2) Learning to cope;  3) Loneliness;  and 4) Moral failure.  All four of 
these themes were experienced by each participant in their own unique way.  The 
first theme, ‘Feeling different’, expresses how the participants felt that they were 
not “normal” and contrasted themselves with others around them.  Feeling that 
they struggled with tasks and situations that others managed easily led to the 
participants feeling stressed.  The second theme, ‘Learning to cope’, describes how 
they had all learned and were still learning various ways to manage their 
condition.  The third theme, ‘Loneliness’, shows that the participants all felt socially 
isolated at times, but had mixed feelings towards this isolation.  The fourth theme, 
‘Moral failure’, expresses how the participants all felt at times that they were 
failing morally and not doing things they ought to be doing.  In this section I will 
expand on each of these four themes in order. 
3.1  Feeling Different 
This theme is divided into four subthemes.  3.1.1) Being unusual:  the 
participants felt they were not “normal”.  3.1.2) Comparing selves to others:  the 
participants contrasted themselves with other people, in that they needed help 
with ordinary tasks.  3.1.3) Contrast with pre-diagnosis self:  the participants with 
TBI contrasted themselves with their pre-injury self, while those with 
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prosopagnosia believed that their minds worked in abnormal ways, since they had 
found out about their condition.  3.1.4) Stress of being different:  all four 
participants spoke of feeling stressed by the extra demands of living with their 
condition. 
3.1.1 Being unusual   
The participants all expressed a sense of being unusual, and of having 
“strange” or “bizarre” experiences.  They described their experiences to me with a 
tone that suggested that they expected me to be surprised.   Murray had the 
“feeling that people may look at you strangely”.  Huia described her inability to 
remember meeting her son’s friends as “a bit weird, bit disconcerting.”  Karl 
recalled hallucinating “silver raindrops” and trying to touch them to see if they 
were real or not, an episode which he said was “bizarre.”  Charlotte used the same 
word regarding her communication difficulties: “I say the most stupid bizarre 
things!”  These experiences highlighted to the participants that they were different 
from others. 
3.1.2 Comparing selves to others   
The participants contrasted themselves to other people or to what they 
considered normal.  They felt that they were unable to do things that other people 
could, and that they needed more help with things than others did.  Karl attempted 
to return to work not long after his accident but found he was unable to manage “a 
normal day’s work, I can’t go […] even an eight hour distance”: in this phrase, the 
word “even” expresses his belief that eight hours is a normal and reasonable length 
of time to be able to work.   Huia felt different from the other teachers at her 
workplace who could learn the names of the children in their classes in “maybe a 
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couple of weeks,” while she was still unable to do so by the middle of the year.  
Both Charlotte and Murray needed their spouses to help them:  Charlotte said 
“often you have to be parented by your husband to be a parent;” Murray left it up 
to his wife to take their children places, and relied on her to give him clues as to 
who people were in social conversations. 
3.1.3 Contrast with pre-diagnosis self 
 As well as comparing themselves to others, the participants with TBI 
contrasted themselves to how they had been before their accidents.  They spoke 
about how things had changed since their accidents:  Charlotte used to be a very 
social person but the TBI made conversation exhausting, for example, while Karl 
talked about how he was now unable to do much of the “bloke stuff” he used to 
enjoy as hobbies.  They considered these things that they used to do “normal”, and 
therefore the life they lived now was not normal, as Karl put it: “I just want life to 
get back to normal.”   
Those with prosopagnosia also felt different, in that the way their minds 
worked was not “normal”, or as Huia put it, they believed that their brain was “not 
quite wired up” properly.  This belief stemmed from the time when they learned 
about prosopagnosia as a condition.  Murray described the moment he realised he 
could have a neurological condition as being when “it suddenly registered the 
impact or that it was not normal, perhaps. Or that it wasn’t that I was just not good 
with faces.”   Discovering prosopagnosia and diagnosing themselves with it was a 
positive experience for both.  Huia said that finding out that “it might not be me 
personally” was a relief, while Murray said that “realising that you have got some 
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difference makes it easier”.  Nonetheless, living with this unusual condition added 
stress to their lives. 
3.1.4 Stress of being different 
All the participants talked about the stress of living with their condition, as it 
made life more difficult than they felt it ought to be.  Three of them described 
feeling frustrated, even angry.  Murray and Huia found it stressful having to deal 
with large numbers of people at once in work environments, particularly when 
they needed to know others’ names.  Huia provided an illustration:   
“Staff meetings. Every so often we take a turn at […] chairing the meeting so 
people put up their hands and I can't call their names … yeah, so it causes 
quite a lot of stress.”  
Karl found that the financial stress of being out of work compounded with the 
stress arising from his condition, where he needed “peace and quiet” to deal with 
fatigue but was surrounded by a family of small children, and that “there [was] no 
respite.”  Because her accident was fourteen years ago at the time of the interview, 
Charlotte had had longer than the others to learn to manage the stress of her 
condition, but still found tasks like supermarket shopping stressful:   
“You’re so determined about what you want and you’re trying to find it and 
you get so frustrated when they change the damn packaging and things ’cause 
you can’t damn well find it!”  
At our follow-up interview, Charlotte emphasised that because she had had 
more than ten years to learn to live with her TBI, she no longer felt the stress and 
frustration so strongly.  She believed she had learned to cope.  The other 
participants were still in the process of learning. 
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3.2  Learning to Cope 
All the participants spoke of the ways that they had learned to manage their 
condition.  They had developed strategies over time as they learned from 
experience what was helpful in various situations.  Three different methods of 
coping were described by the participants, and these constitute the three 
subthemes of this section: 3.2.1) Avoidance, 3.2.2) Accepting limitations, and 3.2.3) 
Using active strategies.  
3.2.1 Avoidance 
Two different forms of avoidance were illustrated within the participants’ 
narratives: 1) cognitive or emotional avoidance, for example Karl trying to think 
about other things when feeling “depressed”; and 2) behavioural avoidance, like 
the participants with prosopagnosia avoiding tasks which required face 
recognition. Karl underlined his reliance on cognitive avoidance at our second 
discussion by essentially repeating what he had said in the first interview:   
“That’s the best I’ve come up with so far, just try and slap myself out of the 
thinking process and try something different. And just jump […] from one 
railway line to a different railway line.”  
Karl had also learned to switch tasks as a means of promoting cognitive 
avoidance, to stop unwanted rumination:  “I know now to try and do something 
else, to get away from that thinking process.”  Charlotte said she learned what was 
important and put the things that were not important “somewhere else,” 
demonstrating behavioural avoidance.  Similarly, Murray and Huia, with face-
blindness, avoided tasks which would require unaided facial recognition.  Huia 
described her feelings about being asked to do tasks which were beyond her:   
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“I used to put that sort of job off, and I’d be trying to think of what I was going 
to do about it and getting worried about it, but now I just go, ‘oh, I’ll get one of 
the kids to do it. Great.’” 
This demonstrates that Huia found behavioural avoidance was originally attended 
with feelings of anxiety, but became a more positive form of coping as she began to 
accept her limitations.  
3.2.2 Accepting limitations 
The participants to some degree had come to accept the limitations that their 
condition imposed on them: they were not entirely in control of their lives, but 
forces outside of them were at work.  Because they could not change their 
condition, they had to accept its reality and instead adapt their roles and 
expectations.  The participants spoke of their condition as an outside agent which 
imposed restrictions on them, as Murray said:  “It restricts the directions you go or 
what you take on.”  Charlotte personified her TBI:  “It’s the head injury that pulls us 
down a huge amount.”  Karl spoke with deep emotion about being compelled to 
give up a job which had reinforced his strongly masculine identity:  “Is this where 
I’ve been…?”  His sentence trailed off at this point but his implication was of having 
been left in a bleak situation by an external force.   
Natural forces were seen as also having positive effects, as three participants 
expressed the feeling that things would improve without their input.  Karl said he 
was “slowly getting better.”  Charlotte said her tolerance for sensory stimulation 
had improved since the early years of living with TBI, and she was able to function 
better after her children were old enough not to keep her awake at night.  Huia 
discovered to her surprise that when she had called the roll in her class a few days 
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before our interview, she was looking at the right person when she called a name 
more often than she expected (although her recognition ability was still not 
approaching that of other teachers).  Huia interpreted this experience as showing 
that perhaps “relaxing” about her deficits had helped her “make more 
connections”, and that there were “levels” of person-recognition which were not 
impaired by her condition.  She was cautiously optimistic that she would continue 
to improve. 
Three of the participants had changed their roles, and all of them had 
changed their expectations.  Before her accident Charlotte was a successful 
businesswoman, but now she was “not allowed” to work, as she explained:  
“[I] get paid every three months from ACC7 and as part of that […] you do a 
whole set of sort of neurological tests or whatever, and they say to me “you 
can’t work again because your injury is so severe”.”  
Karl was no longer able to work in forestry, but had become the primary caregiver 
for his children, while his wife took on the ‘breadwinner’ role.  Huia was a waitress 
early in her career, but found that her inability to recognise regular patrons made 
the job impossible to sustain.  By contrast, Murray had been farming “all [his] life,” 
which he had resented when he was younger, but had come to accept:  “I'm 
perhaps in more the right place than I would have thought once.”8   
The three participants who had had (or known about) their condition for less 
than five years were beginning to accept their limitations, as Charlotte had over 
                                            
7 Accident Compensation Corporation, New Zealand’s state-owned no-fault accident insurance 
provider. 
8 Interestingly, at the time of our second interview, Murray had decided to move off the farm and 
into town. This made me reflect on the comment I had written in his case summary (see Appendix 
6.9.4) about him being like “an espaliered tree,” a metaphor he had initially rejected (he told me at 
our second interview) but had gradually come to accept as correct. I wondered whether my 
interpretation of his narrative had influenced his decision to leave the farm. I was somewhat 




the 14 years since her accident.  Huia was “starting to understand that [having 
trouble with some everyday tasks is] okay” and felt “a bit more in control” once she 
knew about prosopagnosia as a condition.  When I asked how she dealt with the 
stress she sometimes experienced, she replied, “Ah… joke about it,” which 
indicated that she was comfortable enough about her condition to make light of it.  
Murray talked about his deficits as “things that you work around or you live with,” 
and, similarly, said that now that he knew about prosopagnosia he didn’t “feel 
quite as bad about it.”  Karl recognised that some of the issues he faced were “all 
part of this silly thing,” and was able to joke a little, but he was still struggling to 
come to terms with his condition.  As he laughingly said,  
“I wanna get out working.  It’s easier to go to work than be a bloody parent at 
home! Oh my goodness!  Lord, if this is a test, oh I’ve flunked! […] No, men need 
to be at work, women wish9 to be at work.”   
One of the most striking features of Karl’s narrative was that he blamed 
outside forces for many of the problems he faced:  
“These things just destroy your hope.”  
“ACC got rid of us […] and then stopped us from getting any help.”   
“They’ve just squashed us.” 
“No-one will employ me.”  
I compared Karl’s interpretations of his experiences with Charlotte’s and 
found conspicuous differences:  
“They say to me ‘you can’t work again because your injury is so severe’ […] 
and besides you know you can’t work.”9 
                                            




“You’ve had to work things out for yourself.” 
“You have to gradually do a certain amount and then do it, and then see how 
you’re feeling at the end of the day. Okay, that means I can do that again. You 
gotta try it out and you gotta try and push yourself a little bit more each time 
to see, all other things being equal, can I do that amount? And then how do I 
feel?” 
From these quotes, it is evident that Charlotte largely felt in control of her 
life, while Karl did not.  This contrast led me to consider the role of attributions 
and perceived self-efficacy in the way people with neurological conditions cope 
with difficulties, which will be covered in more detail in the Discussion (section 
4.2.2 below).  Karl’s inability to return to his former identity was a serious 
challenge to him; however, he was able to try some different approaches to 
manage his symptoms actively. 
3.2.3 Using active strategies 
Three different types of active strategies were described by the participants. 
They experimented with different aids to help them manage everyday tasks, 
sought help from other people, and learned preventive strategies to forestall 
negative experiences.  One important preventive strategy all four participants used 
was hiding their condition from others in order to avoid judgment or 
discrimination. 
Using aids.  The participants had experimented with different techniques 
and had found aids which helped them.  Murray and Charlotte found computers 
useful in different ways:  Murray had worked for some time in a reception job and 
the appointments screen on the computer “usually gave me a pretty strong 
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indication who would walk in the door;”  Charlotte used the computer in her 
kitchen to read my information sheet aloud to her while she made me a cup of tea 
when I arrived for our interview, and explained that she often used it this way.  
Karl found that he was able to manage swimming if he used a snorkel to prevent 
the vertigo caused by repeatedly turning his head to breathe.  Huia created file 
cards full of details on her students to help her remember personal details so she 
could demonstrate to them and their parents at parent-teacher interviews that she 
knew and cared about them.  
Seeking help.  The participants asked others for help, both within and 
outside of the family.  Huia and Murray both asked their spouses to tell them who 
people were, and Huia’s husband helped her follow movie plots.  Karl approached 
several agencies, but he did not receive all the help he asked for:  “I need help, you 
can’t get that help.”  Charlotte, in contrast, received government-funded home 
assistance.  She used this assistance in combination with her self-developed 
strategies of resting during the day and writing everything down “so you’re not 
worried about things when you go to bed”:  she would write down tasks for the 
“girls” (her home helpers) so they would do things the way she wanted them to. 
Using preventive strategies.  Charlotte resting during the day is an example 
of a preventive strategy, which the participants had all developed in various forms. 
Preventive strategies differ from avoidance in that the participants were not using 
them to avoid situations as they arose, but taking steps beforehand to ensure they 
did not have to deal with worse situations later.  Both Charlotte and Karl found 
they were not as badly affected by the fatigue consequent on their TBI if they 
rested during the day, and Charlotte found that she slept better at night if she made 
sure to exercise during the day.  Both Murray and Huia were “very careful about 
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using people’s names,” and Huia said she would “call them ‘Miss’ or ‘sweetie’, or, 
‘would you mind doing so-and-so?’ without directly saying who it is.”  This 
compensatory strategy prevented the embarrassment of potentially calling 
someone well-known by the wrong name.   
All four participants had hidden their condition at times and used secrecy as 
a means of coping, seeking to avert discrimination from others.  Charlotte liked 
that if she did not tell people about her condition, she was “just like everyone else.”  
Karl told “porkies”10 when he was asked if he was fit to return to work, to avoid the 
“humiliation” of having to tell people he was struggling with poor concentration 
and vertigo.  Huia found that when she did tell one class about her condition, they 
took advantage of it with “a bit of game-playing, you know, fourteen-year-old girls, 
bit of game-playing,” which for some time afterward sapped her confidence in 
sharing her needs with others.  This illustrates the dilemma the participants faced: 
they did not want to stand out as different, but they faced challenges that others 
did not face and did not understand.  This could be lonely. 
3.3  Loneliness 
Loneliness was a fact of life for the participants.  Three subthemes within the 
theme of loneliness were formulated from the participants’ narratives, as outlined 
in the following sections.  3.3.1) Ambivalence: the participants were ambivalent 
about their social isolation:  they felt lonely, but the two with prosopagnosia 
believed they had introverted personalities and were comfortable being alone, 
while the two with TBI welcomed solitude as providing relief from the demands of 
interacting with others.  3.3.2) Difficulty with social interaction:  all the 
                                            
10 That is, lies. From cockney rhyming slang: pork pies = lies (Wilkes & Krebs, 1991). 
43 
 
participants found social interaction challenging.  3.3.3) Wanting to be understood:  
the participants wanted others to understand their condition.  They felt 
misunderstood, even by those closest to them.    
3.3.1 Ambivalence 
The participants spoke matter-of-factly about having limited social activity.  
Both Karl and Charlotte said they had no real social life, while Murray said, “I don’t 
network.”  Huia said she had “some good strong friends and people who I know, 
but yeah, [prosopagnosia] does get in the way of those relationships.”  The two 
participants with prosopagnosia wondered if their failure to make connections 
with people was partly because of their personality.  Huia remarked that she was 
an “introvert […] in many respects”, while Murray called himself a “loner.”  The two 
with TBI sometimes felt that they wanted to be alone because of fatigue or the 
demands of interacting with others.  Karl stated this strongly:  “I wanna be alone! I 
just want peace and quiet! I don't want the nagging.”  Charlotte told a series of 
stories which illustrated her experience of “crappy” social interactions which she 
preferred to avoid, and agreed with my summary:   
Interviewer: “Do you feel like, perhaps, you feel the need to be a bit choosy 
because of your energy levels, and just chatting is really exhausting?” 
Charlotte: “Yup, yup, absolutely.  […]  What you’re saying is exactly right.”  
3.3.2 Difficulty with social interaction 
The condition itself made social interaction difficult.  For the participants 
with TBI, this was because of sensory and concentration issues or 
miscommunication.  Hypersensitivity to sound was a barrier to enjoying social 
events.  Karl explained:   
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“in the last two years I think we went out twice. […] Any loud music, and it just 
drives me insane, just wanna go up and punch the bloody drummers and 
things.”   
Similarly, Charlotte likened hearing loud noises to being kicked in the head.  
Halfway through our interview, she told me: “this interview, simple questions but 
it’s absolutely exhausting and it’ll probably wipe up the rest of my day.”   Both 
Charlotte and Karl several times asked me to repeat questions (“what was the 
question again, sorry?”) and lost their train of thought.  Karl said there were times 
when he had miscommunicated with someone and was “unaware that I’m actually 
upsetting them.”   
For the participants with prosopagnosia, the fact that they could not 
remember people meant they could not easily build relationships.  As Murray said: 
“I might know a lot of people if I could remember them!”  Prosopagnosia made it 
hard to hold conversations as the participants were worried about making 
mistakes, and this worry persisted even though they had learned strategies to 
reduce the risk of embarrassment, as outlined in section 3.2.3 above.  Murray 
laughed as he explained that he was wary about using people’s names during 
conversation because he might “have the wrong person.”  Huia found it frustrating 
that because she could not easily “get to know my students on a personal level,” 
she could not build the kind of warm relationships she wanted, and added: “that’s a 
bit of sadness really.”  Huia and Murray also both mentioned that they often fail to 
make eye contact with people, which Huia suggested might contribute to her 
inadequacy at building relationships, while Murray mused on the connection 
between eye contact and social relationships with prosopagnosia: 
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“Maybe you don’t take enough notice of faces because they don’t mean much 
to us! I suspect I don’t look people in the face—no, doesn’t register—and 
that’s probably ’cause I’m not getting a lot of feedback.  […] That might be one 
of the reasons [unclear]11 I haven’t really looked that closely at the face but 
they’re all, tend to be the same.”  
3.3.3 Wanting to be understood 
The participants wanted to be understood, and to allow others to be open 
with them as well.  Huia and Charlotte spoke about telling others about their 
difficulties.  Huia said that although she didn’t want to burden her students with 
her problems, she wanted a “bit of understanding – it’s a bit of a two-way street.”  
In a similar vein, Charlotte said that when she “exposed a bit” about herself, that 
allowed others to share their experiences of TBI with her, and that was “actually 
really good.”   
The participants felt that other people didn’t understand their condition, 
even those closest to them.  Karl and Murray both described how their wives were 
unaware of the extent of their difficulties (though Murray’s wife understood more 
after watching a television documentary about face-blindness).  Karl poignantly 
expressed the desperate feeling of loneliness caused by this lack of understanding: 
“when I’m bedridden, I’m just so exhausted, […] and then I get [high pitched 
angry voice] “Get outta bed, you’re just being lazy!” It’s just like, I can’t 
function.12   But that, no-one sees it. No-one sees it.”  
                                            
11 Murray’s interview was carried out via Skype and occasionally the sound quality was poor. 
12 Underlined words denote the participant’s spoken emphasis. 
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This quote demonstrates how the theme of loneliness is strongly connected with 
the following theme of moral failure: others often seemed to assume that the 
participants were lazy or rude because they didn’t understand their impairments.  
3.4  Moral Failure 
The theme of Moral Failure is divided into three subthemes. 3.4.1) Doing 
‘wrong’ things:  the participants sometimes did things which they felt were ‘wrong’ 
in order to manage their condition.  3.4.2) Guilt at deficiencies:  the participants 
felt guilty because of their deficiencies in social situations.  3.4.3) Feeling judged:  
they believed that other people made moral judgments about their failures, and 
this belief contributed to the participants’ social anxiety and isolation.  Charlotte’s 
experience at an ANZAC Day parade encapsulates this theme neatly: 
“I remember going to a ANZAC Day [dawn service], and I had to sit down!  And 
I had to sit down amongst all these older people, and I could feel them all just 
like, “what is this woman doing sitting where we are?”  And you know, I had to 
sit down.  And I get quite panicky, it’s like I’d have to.  […] And yeah, I could 
just feel them “why is this woman sitting with us, she looks okay!” And I just 
thought they just have no idea at all.”13 
3.4.1 Doing ‘wrong’ things 
The participants sometimes did things which were arguably ‘wrong’ in order 
to live with their condition.  Karl told “porkies” to his employers about his health in 
order to give himself a chance to test his limits at work, as well as to save himself 
the humiliation of saying he was unable to perform.  Huia used what she described 
                                            
13 Underlined words denote the participant’s spoken emphasis. 
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as “sneaky” means of recognising people, such as memorising their clothes and 
hairstyles, when she could not manage the ‘proper’ means of remembering faces; 
she also “overcompensated” by being friendly to everyone in order to avoid being 
seen as rude.  Charlotte “upset” her children by removing their toys from the living 
areas of the home in order to maintain the tidy and peaceful environment she 
found necessary to manage her sensory hypersensitivity. 
3.4.2 Guilt at deficiencies 
The participants felt that they were not able to do things that they should be 
able to do, or that they did things that they should not do.  Nobody criticised 
Charlotte for sitting down at the ANZAC Day dawn service, but she felt defensive 
and “panicky” when her need to manage her TBI conflicted with socially acceptable 
behaviour.  Karl described saying things he regretted and berating himself later.  
Murray said that he made “some horrible faux pas!” and that sometimes after 
talking to someone suddenly he would “click” he should have known them.  Huia 
was embarrassed and concerned when she was unable to remember whether she 
had met her son’s girlfriends before.  Even though the participants knew that they 
were not to blame for these things, they still experienced a sense of moral failure, a 
feeling that they were at fault. As Huia put it:  “there’s still that sorta guilty feeling 
about, oh, […] ‘if I was really interested in them, you know, if I really cared’…”   
3.4.3 Feeling judged 
The participants believed that other people thought that these things they did 
(or did not do) were because they were lazy or crazy or rude or aloof.  Charlotte 
spoke with some chagrin of being called “exclusive” because she was quite 
selective with her social interactions.  Murray thought that others found him 
48 
 
“aloof” or “remote.”  Huia articulated the trial of living with prosopagnosia in a 
sentence:  “We have such a connection with identity that people think you’re being 
really rude if you don’t know their name, you don’t care about them.”  Karl 
succinctly summed up the problem of the invisible nature of mild-moderate TBI:  







In this study, I sought answers to four research questions: 1) How does 
having an invisible neurological condition affect the day-to-day functioning of this 
person in the world?  2) How has this person experienced the effect of their 
invisible neurological condition on their family life, in terms of their interactions 
with their partner and children?  3) How are these experiences affected by the 
aetiology of the condition – be it congenital (prosopagnosia) or acquired (TBI)?  
And finally, 4) are there gender-based differences in the way family life is 
experienced between men and women with an invisible neurological condition?  
Because I used an inductive research process—which is to say I followed where 
my participants led—I was not seeking definitive answers to all four of these 
questions.  Instead, my aim was to gain insight into the day-to-day functioning of a 
person with an invisible neurological condition, and I did see some possible 
patterns of experience which were shaped by the aetiology of the condition; 
however, the participants did not distinguish family life from other contexts when 
talking about their experiences, and I did not find any themes which appeared 
unique to one gender or the other. 
In this section I first summarise my findings; secondly, I describe how these 
findings connect with existing literature and theories; thirdly, I discuss the 




4.1 Summary of Findings 
Because of their TBI or prosopagnosia, the participants felt different from 
others around them.  They felt that their experiences were bizarre, and they 
contrasted themselves with ‘normal’ people.  Those with TBI compared themselves 
with how they had been before their injury, while those with prosopagnosia felt 
that their brains were faulty.  All four participants felt stressed by the demands of 
being different.  The participants had learned, and were learning, ways to cope 
with their condition.  They avoided upsetting thoughts and difficult tasks, they 
accepted that they had limitations, and they had learned active strategies to 
compensate for their deficits.  These active strategies included using aids, asking 
others for help, and doing what they could to prevent issues from arising.  One key 
preventive strategy that they all used was to hide their condition from others.  The 
participants were lonely at times.  They were ambivalent about social isolation, as 
they found social interaction difficult, but they wanted to be understood.  They felt 
that they did things that were arguably wrong in order to live with their condition.  
They felt guilty when they were unable to meet their own and others’ expectations, 
and believed that others judged them unfairly. 
4.2 Relation to Existing Literature 
4.2.1 Feeling different 
My finding that my participants felt different from others around them is 
consistent with the literature on both prosopagnosia and TBI discussed in the 
Introduction (sections 1.1.1.7 and 1.1.2.5 above).  Yardley et al. (2008) carried out 
semi-structured telephone interviews with 25 people with developmental 
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prosopagnosia (18 women, age range 26 to 74 years), asking questions about how 
prosopagnosia affected their life, how they believed others saw them, and how 
they coped with negative experiences and emotions that arose from their 
condition.  One participant is reported as saying “‘I didn’t talk to anyone about it 
’cause I thought everybody else had this and they were managing and it was like I 
wasn’t managing to do what everybody else was doing’” (Yardley et al., 2008, p. 
448).  This is similar to Murray, in the present study, who for many years assumed 
that he “was just not good with faces” and did not realise “that it was not normal” 
(see Findings section 3.1.3).  Diaz (2008) presented a case study of a thirteen-year-
old boy and his mother with congenital prosopagnosia, detailing the development 
of a programme to help the boy function better at school.  He gained a reputation 
for being “weird” (Diaz, 2008, p.287), which seems likely to have been reported by 
the child himself (as no interviews with his peers are mentioned) indicating that he 
felt himself to be weird.  He was also quoted as saying that he liked “‘being his own 
person, not a copy of another kid’” (Diaz, 2008, p.288), which showed that he was 
able to accept his uniqueness as positive.  In the present study, Huia said that she 
was “starting to understand that that’s okay,” being different and having difficulty 
with things that others found easy (Findings section 3.2.2). 
People with TBI are also reported as feeling different from those around 
them.  Conneeley (2002) interviewed eighteen patients with TBI, their significant 
other (a parent or spouse) and members of the patient’s rehabilitation team at 
three times during the year following their injury.  They found that people with TBI 
may end up occupying the position of “stranger” in their social groups because 
they have had experiences that others in the group do not share. 
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Past research suggests that for people with TBI, the most salient experience 
of being different is in the change from a former self.  The participants with TBI in 
the present study, as well as having “bizarre” episodes of miscommunication or 
hallucination, contrasted their present selves with their past. This “changed sense 
of personal identity” (Levack et al., 2010, p. 990) is a key finding in Levack et al.’s 
(2010) metasynthesis of 23 studies investigating the lived experience of TBI 
acquired during adulthood, and highlights one of the ways in which aetiology 
affects the experience of living with an invisible neurological condition.  The 
participants with developmental prosopagnosia did not have the same sense of 
changed identity.  When I asked how things had changed since learning about 
prosopagnosia, both Murray and Huia said that they  themselves hadn’t changed, 
though they felt a little better about their difficulties. 
4.2.2 Attributions, stress and coping 
The stress experienced by people with a chronic condition, like the 
participants in the present study, can be categorised as arising from a chronic 
persistent event (Lazarus, 1984).  Small hassles which were part of the 
participants’ everyday life, such as supermarket shopping, chairing meetings, 
dealing with tradesmen, and getting children to ballet class with all their gear, 
were appraised as a potential source of fatigue, failure or embarrassment and thus 
were stressful.  Participants in the current study had a variety of ways of dealing 
with this stress.  The themes I developed inductively from their narratives map 
fairly well onto three styles of coping outlined by Richards and Folkman (2000): 
emotion-focused coping is similar to my subtheme of avoidance (Findings section 
3.2.1), problem-focused coping is similar to my subtheme of using active strategies 
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(Findings section 3.2.3), and meaning-based coping is similar to my subtheme of 
accepting limitations (Findings section 3.2.2).  My participants used these styles of 
coping in their own individual ways and to varying degrees.  This was one of the 
few areas where gender did appear to have some effect: both women talked about 
being organised, while both men seemed to prefer avoidant strategies. 
In general, avoidant coping styles are associated with more problems than 
active coping methods when used long term (Taylor & Stanton, 2007).  However, a 
recent study of 93 patients with acquired brain injury found that the use of 
problem-focused coping styles correlated with better outcomes in terms of self-
reported quality of life for patients with higher executive function but poorer 
outcomes for patients who had more trouble with executive functioning (Gregorio 
et al., 2015).  This would suggest that recommending problem-focused coping 
styles is not necessarily appropriate in all cases, and perhaps learned helplessness 
may in some cases be real helplessness due to difficulties with functioning.  In such 
situations it may be most adaptive for people to change their paradigm of what 
constitutes a good quality of life.  
This change in paradigm is termed “response shift” by Richards and Folkman 
(2000).  According to their terminology, meaning-based coping comes into use 
when a person is unable to find a favourable resolution to a stressful situation by 
using problem- or emotion-focused coping, and response shift is the change from 
one interpretation of the meaning of an experience or event to a new 
interpretation.  Results drawn from a longitudinal study of 145 gay men who were 
primary caregivers of partners with terminal AIDS revealed that those men who 
were able to reinterpret their situations to find positive meaning experienced 
sometimes surprisingly high levels of wellbeing during an extremely distressing 
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time (Folkman, Chesney, & Christopher-Richards, 1994, as cited by Richards & 
Folkman, 2000).  Although the experience of living with a chronic neurological 
condition is very different from caring for a dying partner, it has some similarities 
in that the source of stress is chronic and unremitting (Lazarus, 1984).   
Charlotte exhibited meaning-based coping when she described herself as 
being lucky to still be here, given that she had been in two car crashes, ten years 
apart, and in both cases her fellow passenger had been killed.  I was amazed to 
hear that someone who had been through such trauma and experienced such 
damage could consider herself lucky.  Charlotte was so grateful to be alive that she 
had begun attending church in order to express her gratitude to God.  Her response 
is similar to that of some of the participants in Howes et al. (2005) study of women 
following TBI who made changes to their lives and came to “live for the moment 
[and] appreciate things more” (Howes et al., 2005, p. 136).   
The striking contrast between Karl’s and Charlotte’s locus of control 
(Findings section 3.2.2) highlighted the important role of attributions in coping 
with a TBI.  Hunt, Turner, Polatajko, Bottari, and Dawson (2013) reviewed 
literature dealing with attribution, executive function and self-regulation in adults 
with brain injury and clarified the connection between these three constructs.  
Being able to attribute events appropriately to internal or external factors has 
considerable influence on how someone plans and evaluates their self-regulatory 
behaviour.  If they make incorrect attributions in either direction (thinking they 
have either more or less control over a situation than they actually do), they may 
experience repeated failures, with concomitant reduced self-efficacy and feelings 
of helplessness and emotional distress (Hunt et al., 2013).  This could lead to a 
reduced quality of life and poorer outcomes.  Moore and Stambrook (1995) 
55 
 
conceptualised the relationships between self-efficacy beliefs, coping patterns and 
quality of life outcomes following TBI.  Their hypothesis, that the “after-effects of 
TBI may create a real life ‘learned helplessness’ with consequent deficits in coping 
and altered locus of control beliefs” (Moore & Stambrook, 1995, p. 109), is 
supported by recent studies by Brands, Koehler, Stapert, Wade, and van Heugten 
(2014) and Gregorio, Gould, Spitz, van Heugten, and Ponsford (2014) among 
others.  In a study of 136 individuals with TBI assessed after discharge from 
rehabilitation and again after one year, those with higher perceived self-efficacy 
used more task-oriented coping and less emotion-oriented coping, while more 
emotion-oriented coping was used by patients with higher levels of emotional 
distress and worse executive function (Brands et al., 2014).  Karl and Charlotte 
respectively seem to exemplify people with low and high perceived self-efficacy, 
perhaps arising from their respective external and internal attribution styles.  Karl 
generally used emotion-focused coping, using tasks to distract him from “the 
stupidity of hopelessness”, while Charlotte focused on learning efficient methods 
to achieve all she wanted to without overtaxing her physical stamina or cognitive 
capacity.  It is interesting to note that Karl and Charlotte had had very different 
experiences of government agency support from ACC, for while Charlotte received 
funded home help, Karl found himself with complex unresolved circumstances 
very similar to those described by Howes et al. (2005) as leading to feelings of 
persecution, helplessness and significant loss of self-esteem. 
Murray and Huia demonstrated a response shift when they learned that their 
life-long struggle with remembering people was the result of a neurological 
condition.  They changed their attribution of their failures from internal (thinking 
perhaps they were stupid or not trying hard enough) to external (believing there 
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was something in their brain that was “not quite wired up”), and found relief from 
the weight of guilt and frustration.   
4.2.3 Stigma, judgment and guilt 
Stigma has been conceptualised as being composed of five interrelated 
components: labelling human differences; linking persons to negative stereotypes; 
separating ‘us’ from ‘them’; discrimination against the labelled person, leading to 
unequal outcomes; and finally, all these processes taking place within a context of 
social, economic and political power which makes such labelling, stereotyping, 
separation and discrimination possible (Link & Phelan, 2001).  Negative 
stereotypes exist regarding people with TBI: they are expected by some to be more 
aggressive, dependent and unhappy than average, and to have some visible sign of 
their disability (Linden & Boylan, 2010).  People treat them differently after they 
disclose their condition (Conneeley, 2002; Morris et al., 2005; Olney & Kim, 2001).  
Karl concealed his reason for not returning to work after his injury because he did 
not want his workmates to know he was struggling with vertigo and fatigue.  He 
felt that revealing weakness in his forestry work context would have been 
humiliating for him.  Fear of appearing weak is also seen in Yardley et al.’s (2008) 
study, where a participant said:  
“I wasn't managing to do what everybody else was doing so I was a bit weak, 
and so I didn't want to let anybody know how weak I was” (Yardley et al., 
2008, p. 448).   
Negative stereotypes are also associated with mental deficiency, and people 
with developmental prosopagnosia may fear being stigmatised in this way if they 
reveal their condition (Yardley et al., 2008).  The discomfort that can accompany 
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self-revelation was seen in Huia’s narrative when she told the story of her class 
taking advantage of her face-blindness with a “bit of game-playing,” and how this 
sapped her confidence to share her condition with others.  
However, failing to reveal their condition can lead to people with 
neurological conditions having their behaviour misinterpreted as evidence of 
mental illness (another highly stigmatised condition), drunkenness, stupidity or 
laziness (Howes et al., 2005; Yardley et al., 2008).  Psychotherapist Monica 
Zenonos wrote in an article based on her own experience of being face-blind,  
“Coming out as face-blind is similar to other coming out processes: embedded 
in shame, internalised oppression and insecurities about whether people will 
accept you or even believe that such a thing as face-blindness exists” 
(Zenonos, 2014, p. 22).   
People who choose whether or not to disclose a new identity walk a precarious 
line between exposing themselves to discrimination or rejection if they do come 
out, and maintaining a false front, with all the attendant negative consequences to 
health and wellbeing, if they do not (Flowers & Buston, 2001).  Charlotte said she 
felt lucky that she looked “just like everyone else.”  However she also said that 
sometimes it was “nice to be able to […] pull something out of your pocket and that 
saves you a wee bit.”  Telling people she had a brain injury saved her from social 
judgment, because she had a socially acceptable reason for socially unacceptable 
behaviour.   
4.3 Strengths and Limitations 
In this study I gained an in-depth understanding of the experiences of four 
people with self-reported invisible neurological conditions at a single point in time, 
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which is an appropriate sample size for a phenomenological study.  All four 
participants were middle-aged and of European descent; experiences would likely 
be different for other demographics.   I did not undertake any screening to support 
my participants’ self-reported diagnoses.  If this had been a larger scale or 
quantitative study, these details (for example Glasgow Coma scores or Cambridge 
Face Recognition Test results) would have been required.  However, for a small-
scale study focusing on lived experience, I decided that formal diagnoses were not 
as important as the participants’ own beliefs about their condition, as these beliefs 
would have more impact on their daily lives than test scores.  In the end, the 
recruitment process took longer and was more difficult than I anticipated, and 
adding an extra screening process could have extended the participant search 
beyond what was practicable. 
I widened the pool of available participants by using Skype as an interview 
medium.  I was able to recruit a participant (Murray) who lived more than 100 
kilometres away and interview him in his home without having to expend the 
resources required to travel there.  Skype interviews have the limitation that both 
interviewer and participant must have the appropriate software and an adequate 
internet connection, and in my experience there are inevitably minor difficulties 
initiating the connection. Additionally, as footnoted in Findings section 3.3.3, the 
sound quality was poorer than my face-to-face interviews and the image froze 
occasionally, which meant that more words were inaudible than in the other 
transcripts.  Nevertheless I was still able to capture sufficient data to analyse so 




My findings were given validation by presenting all four participants with 
their own individual case summary (Appendices 6.9.1-6.9.4 below) and a summary 
of the full findings at a second meeting with each participant, where all four 
enthusiastically endorsed my themes.  The findings are not intended to be 
representative of all people with similar conditions, and my findings are therefore 
not able to be generalised.  Nor am I able to make any predictions about the 
development of any of my themes over time, because this study comprised only 
one single in-depth interview.  However, my findings do offer some insights into 
the variety and similarity of experiences that exist in people with TBI and 
prosopagnosia.  Furthermore, because the sample was very small, I was able to 
become intimately acquainted with my data and allow the voices of my four 
participants to be clearly heard. 
4.4 Future Research 
Invisible neurological conditions have not often been grouped together in the 
literature, and I believe it could be valuable to do so.  Studies encompassing a 
wider range of invisible conditions could help to conceptualise the complex 
relationships between stigma, secrecy and self-revelation in contexts other than 
sexuality and mental health.  Studies examining further aspects of each of the 
conditions in the present study would also enrich the literature.  There is a great 
deal of scope for future research into the psychosocial aspects of prosopagnosia.  
Longitudinal qualitative studies would be able to chart changes over time both of 
the developmental condition itself and of coping strategies and provide more 
options for health professionals to help patients live well with their condition.  A 
wealth of research into psychosocial aspects of TBI has been published, as 
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mentioned in the Introduction, but it would be valuable to look specifically at the 
effect of TBI on family dynamics from the point of view of the person with TBI.   
The present study did not reveal very much about family experiences with 
prosopagnosia or with TBI despite that being a central aim.  A study design 
involving a series of dyadic interviews amongst a family (as employed in the study 
of a family dealing with Alzheimer’s disease by Perry and Olshansky, 1996), or a 
focus group-type study could potentially have teased out more of the shared 
experiences of the group, and informed the construction of more targeted 
individual interview schedules with different members of the family: parents, 
children, partners, and siblings.  This could build up a very rich portrait of the 
shared family experience of the condition in question.  I saw an element of this in 
my interview with one participant whose wife was present, as their shared 
conversation allowed for each to prompt and modify the other’s recollections.  
Furthermore, a qualitative study exploring the experiences of multiple family 
members across generations with congenital prosopagnosia (as seen in Diaz, 
2008) could be fascinating, to explore the roles of family culture, expectations and 
coping strategies.   
It would also be interesting to consider more carefully the differences in 
experience between acquired and developmental prosopagnosia.  Perhaps in the 
acquired condition, elements of identity change would be seen as they are in 
participants with adult-acquired TBI.  Gender may have an effect on strategies and 
coping in both prosopagnosia and in other invisible neurological conditions.  I did 
see an aspect of this (mentioned in section 4.2.2 above) where both women talked 
about being organised, while both men seemed to prefer avoidant strategies for 
dealing with stress.  Studies on the effect of TBI specific to men and to women have 
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been published (for example Howes et al., 2005; Jones & Curtin, 2011b).  A larger 
study including other invisible neurological conditions would be able to elucidate 
more of these differences.   
4.5 Conclusion 
This study extends the TBI literature by showing that there are similarities 
between the lived experiences of TBI and of another neurological condition.  It 
enhances the literature regarding the lived experience of prosopagnosia, where 
little qualitative research has been done until recently.  The findings demonstrate 
some of the psychosocial consequences of prosopagnosia and TBI.  Health 
practitioners may benefit from having more awareness of these consequences in 
order to be better able to help people with these conditions to live well.    
Charlotte, Huia, Karl and Murray each live with a condition which makes 
their lives more challenging as they deal with the daily routines of work, social life 
and family.  They feel different from the people around them.  They sometimes feel 
lonely and misunderstood, sometimes stressed and sometimes guilty, but they are 
coming to terms with their limitations and learning effective strategies to manage 
them.  They are interesting people, and becoming connected with their lives has 
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6.7 Appendix 7:  Interview Questions 
Questions Prompts 
Tell me a bit about yourself.  What kind of person are you? 
What is important to you? 
What do you enjoy? 
Tell me about when you had your injury. 
OR  
How did you come to realise you had 
prosopagnosia? When? 
 
How did [the above] make you feel? At the time? 
Now? 
Have things changed? Tell me about 
that emotional ‘journey’. 
What effects do you think your condition 
has had on your family? 
Spouse/partner? Children? 
Have they had to do things differently? 
Have they talked to you about their 
experience? What sort of things did 
they say? 
What kind of effect has having [your 
condition] had on your work? 
 
On your social life?  
 
[TBI] Do you feel it has been affected? 
How? 
 
[Prosopagnosia] Do you feel you do 
things differently from other people? 
How? 
What effect do you think it has, the fact that 
people can’t see anything ‘wrong’ with 
you? 
What effect does it have on your own 
feelings about your condition? About 
yourself? 
 
Thinking about having [your condition], do 
you expect things to change in the future? 
Why / why not? 
How? 
Are you doing things to make changes? 
What? 
Are there events coming up which you 






























6.11 Appendix 11:  Case Summaries 
6.11.1 Charlotte 
Charlotte (not her real name) is a 44-year-old woman who sustained a 
traumatic brain injury in a car crash fourteen years ago.  The accident which 
caused her injury is the second major car crash she has experienced, the first being 
in the late 1980s.  In both cases, her boyfriend at the time was also in the car and 
was killed.  She is now married and has two children at primary school, while she 
is a full-time homemaker.  She describes herself before the injury as a “very high 
achiever” in every area of her life and says that she hasn’t changed, although the 
head injury “pulls [the family] down a huge amount.”  
Charlotte finds fatigue the biggest problem she has to contend with.  Tasks 
which require extended periods of concentration are now very difficult.  She also 
suffers from hyperacute hearing and vision: she finds loud sounds literally painful, 
and described wearing her sunglasses to the supermarket to reduce the visual 
stimulation.  In order to combat fatigue while still ensuring good quality sleep at 
night, she finds she has to rest in the afternoons and maintain daily exercise.  She 
has a small social circle, because she finds social interaction tiring and does not 
enjoy expending precious energy on small talk.   
In terms of the effect of her brain injury on her family, Charlotte said her 
husband “hates it. With a passion. He’s a major high achiever and my head injury 
rules the house.”  In the interests of keeping her home clean and tidy, Charlotte has 
removed many of the children’s toys from the living area and describes this as 
“unfortunately” making the children “suffer a little bit”.   
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Charlotte has learned strategies to deal with her condition.  She is tactical 
about what tasks she gives her home helpers to allow her to spend time with her 
children as well as by herself.  She has come to accept gradual, small improvements 
in her fitness and ability to perform tasks.  She is glad that her condition is not 
visible, as it allows her to keep it private if she wishes.  She has been pleasantly 
surprised at how many people have some experience of head injury within their 
circles of acquaintance, and she is cheered by hearing that many people do 
similarly “dilly” things without having a brain injury to blame it on.   
Charlotte expressed her feeling of being lucky several times.  She shared with 
great emotion that she is very thankful to be alive, and she has returned to some of 
the Christian practices which were part of her upbringing, in order to express her 
gratitude to God. 
Charlotte’s narrative contains a strong theme of being determined and 
working hard to achieve success.  Before the accident Charlotte attained success in 
academic, sporting and career fields:  “I was a very very high achiever […] and I 
just worked incredibly hard at everything I did.”  Now she has turned her 
determination to bear on dealing successfully with her injury:  “Post injury I 
haven’t changed, and I guess I’ve been very lucky that a lot of the skills I learnt pre 
injury I have pushed myself and maintained, or gone when I’ve developed other 
things.” 
Her experiences illustrate one facet of adapting to limitations, in that she has 
been able to maintain her sense of identity as a high achiever while learning to 





Huia (not her real name) is a 51-year-old woman who came to believe that 
she has face-blindness after reading about the condition on the internet some 
years ago.  She is married and has one adult child.  Huia works in a high school, 
which she says “is a really important part of my identity.”  Environmental issues 
are also important to her and she helps take care of a nearby conservation area. 
Huia has reflected on the relationship between her condition and her core 
values of caring and valuing others’ identities. She finds it hard that although she 
makes a great effort to learn the names of the students in her classes and to note 
down and remember things that are important to them, her efforts are 
undermined by her condition when she cannot put a name to a face.  It makes her 
sad that she is not able to build the close relationships she would like to have.  She 
feels that others think she has not bothered and does not care, when this is the 
very opposite of the truth: “I try and be very organised […] I make the extra effort 
to compensate in other areas”.   
She also finds that her inability to put a name to most of her students has an 
impact on the power that she needs to have as an authority figure.  For example, 
having to ask other students nearby for an offender’s name made it difficult to 
impose discipline in the playground at lunchtime. 
Learning about face-blindness was a relief for Huia, as it explained some of 
the difficulties she faces. She initially thought that her problem was with her 
memory, and that if she just worked harder she would be able to succeed. She now 
feels less “stupid”, more “in control of it,” and is able to make allowances for 
herself: for example, asking students to take the roll or to name the people in 
photographs for the school magazine.  However, when she tried telling one of her 
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classes about her condition, she found that they took advantage of her and 
misbehaved, which she said “sapped my confidence of being able to deal with it.” 
Huia described how her immediate family are not greatly affected by her 
condition, although they do find it annoying when she does not remember, for 
example, her son’s girlfriend or friends who have stayed over at their house.  She 
finds her inability to remember such important figures in her son’s life “a bit weird, 
bit disconcerting.”  Her husband is accustomed to explaining television shows and 
movies to her.  However, as Huia explained: “I see it more tied with the work that I 
do, with a few different hats on, than so much with family stuff.” 
Huia’s narrative contained a strong theme of connecting to people: how 
important this is for us as human beings, and how difficult it is when it is disrupted 
by face-blindness.  Even close friends find it hard to understand the struggles 
caused by living with that condition.  Speaking of her students, she says:  “You 
don’t wanna burden them with stuff, but you want a bit of understanding. It’s a bit 





Karl (not his real name) is a 47-year-old man who sustained a traumatic 
brain injury four years ago while working as a forester.  Before the accident he 
used to enjoy many different outdoor activities like hunting, fishing and diving – 
“just bloke stuff” – and was a soldier for a time.  Karl is married and lives with his 
wife and three children, one a teenager and two under six.  He has been unable to 
return to forestry or full-time work following his accident, so has reluctantly 
become the primary caregiver and homemaker for the family while his wife works. 
Karl described how he is still in the process of working out how to live with 
his condition.  He struggles with fatigue, vertigo and an inability to tolerate noise.  
He sometimes miscommunicates with people and loses his train of thought in 
conversation.  He describes feeling like “someone that’s drunk […] at every 
moment of the day,” and while some days and moments are better than others, the 
feeling never really leaves him.  He has found some strategies which help but is still 
unsure of his capabilities and limitations.  He feels that the help he needs is denied 
him.   
Karl’s treatment by ACC and other organisations contributed significantly to 
the stress he experienced after the accident.  His marriage has been strained since 
his TBI.  He feels that his wife does not really understand what he is going through, 
and that he is unable to live up to her expectations.  He finds it hard to tolerate the 
noise and demands of his energetic family, although this is improving.  The 
financial pressure and worry which arise from his being unable to return to work 
contribute to his stress.  Because his injury is invisible, Karl says that no-one sees 
his struggles, and he feels very alone. 
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Karl’s narrative contains the theme of dealing with challenges to a masculine 
identity.  Before his accident, Karl saw himself as a man who very much fit the 
“bloke” mould.  Now, both his ability to be a ‘good provider’ and to enjoy masculine 
hobbies have been disrupted, and furthermore his desire to fight the system which 
contributed to this disruption has been discouraged by his wife and friends.  The 





Murray (not his real name) is a 68-year-old man who came to believe that he 
has prosopagnosia after watching a television show on the subject in March 2012.  
He is married and has two adult sons.  Murray and his twin brother grew up on a 
farm, and he has been a farmer all his life.  He describes himself as a “somewhat 
solo person or loner.”  His brother tended to take the lead in social situations from 
a young age.  Murray is not certain whether they are identical or not, nor whether 
his twin shares his condition.  Murray believes that his father also had difficulty 
recognising faces, as he now remembers him saying of regularly visiting stock-
truck drivers: “oh they all know me, I don’t know them.” 
In terms of the impact of his prosopagnosia on his family, Murray felt that he 
left anything involving social interaction to his wife. She used to get frustrated with 
him but now that she understands the condition better she gives him “clues” to 
subtly tell him who people are.  For Murray, the fact of being an apparently 
identical twin is very salient.  When he sees people on the street who seem to 
recognise him, he doesn’t know whether it is actually him that they know, and 
therefore he should recognise them, or if they know his brother and are strangers 
to him.  Therefore, when we talk about family impact, Murray is more inclined to 
think of the impact of his family situation on his condition, rather than the reverse. 
Murray has several other mild conditions – he is colour-blind and suspects 
that he has some degree of ADHD – which he is inclined to link with his 
prosopagnosia. He wonders about the relationship between his prosopagnosia and 
his tendency to solitude and the fact that he doesn’t look at people’s faces much. 
Murray’s narrative contains the theme of constructing a coherent identity  
which makes sense of his background, his prosopagnosia and his other various 
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issues. He has adopted the self-definition of being a loner which matches his 
deficits but not necessarily his desired life.  It seems to me that he feels that he has 
adapted to life with his condition(s), but rather in the manner of an espaliered tree, 
forced into a certain shape to suit others. 
 
